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THE STOP PAYMENT OF CHECKS AND THE
HOLDER IN DUE COURSE: A CONFLICTS
AND COMPARATIVE LAW VIEW
DANIEL E. MURRAY*
This article will examine the problems which arise when the
drawer of a check stops payment because of fraud in the inducement,
failure of consideration, or some other personal defense. Three hypo-
thetical situations will serve as the basis for the discussion:
I. A New York drawer issues a check drawn on a New
York bank and payable to a New York payee. The
drawer then stops payment on the check, and the payee
indorses it to a holder'
II. A New York resident, staying in either New York or
Latin America, draws a check on a New York bank
and delivers it to a Latin American payee. The drawer
then stops payment, and the payee indorses the check
to a Latin American holder.
III. A New York resident, while visiting or living in Latin
America, issues a check, drawn on a Latin American
bank, to a payee in the same country. The drawer then
stops payment, and the payee indorses the check to a
holder in the same country.
Although these fact patterns vary only with regard to the situs of one
or more of the parties, it is this minor variation which creates the
difficulties.
I
A New York drawer issues a check drawn on a New York
bank and payable to a New York payee. The drawer then
stops payment on the check, and the payee indorses it to a
holder.
At the outset, it should be noted that stopping payment of a
check is not a panacea. The drawer who stops payment may be gain-
ing only a temporary, tactical victory in that the check will not be
honored. This forces the payee, or a subsequent holder, to institute
an action against the drawer. If litigation is begun, the drawer "has
the burden of establishing any and all defenses, not only in the first
* LL.B., University of Miami, 1949; LL.M., New York University, 1960; J.S.D.,
New York University, 1963; Member, Florida Bar; Professor of Law, University of
Miami.
1 Use of New York as the state involved in these transactions is purely arbitrary,
and its law will not be emphasized.
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instance but by a preponderance of the total evidence."' Because of
this burden, the drawer may have done nothing but delay the date
of payment. At best, if there is in fact a valid defense to the pay-
ment of the check, the payee may decide to let the matter drop if
he is unable to secure payment from the payor bank.
There is, however, a third alternative between these extremes:
if the payee should negotiate the check to a holder in due course
after payment has been refused, the holder in due course will take free
of any personal defenses existing between the drawer and the payee?
When the drawer is sued by the holder in due course, he will have the
same burden of proof regarding defenses as he would have had if the
payee were suing on the check. Once the drawer has sustained his
burden by showing that a "defense exists," the holder then has the
burden of "establishing that he or some person under whom he claims
is in all respects a holder in due course." 4 He must "sustain this bur-
den by affirmative proof that the instrument was taken for value, .. .
in good faith, and . . . without notice . . . 2' 5 In some instances, a
holder may believe that he is unable to prove all of these elements
and may elect to proceed against the payee rather than the drawer.
Consequently, the drawer may escape with no loss in the transaction.
The necessity for speed in the effectuation of the stop-order is
recognized in the Uniform Commercial Code, which provides that an
oral stop-order is binding upon the bank for not more than fourteen
days unless confirmed in writing within that period.' Unfortunately,
Florida' and California' have eliminated oral stop-orders from their
versions of the Code. In these jurisdictions, a fraudulent payee may
be able to win the race to the bank. Banks in these areas may in prac-
tice accept an oral stop-order, and this may be held to constitute a
waiver of the Code requirement for a written notice.' The wording
of the Code provisions in these jurisdictions, however, seems to imply
nonacceptance of a waiver concept.
2 U.C.C. § 3-307, Comment 2. The unfortunate phrase "burden of establishing" a
fact "means the burden of persuading the triers of fact that the existence of the fact
is more probable than its non-existence." U.C.C. § 1-201(8). The "burden of establish-
ing," then, seems to be roughly equivalent to the "burden of persuasion" rule recognized
by the laws of evidence and procedure. James, Civil Procedure 248-80 (1965). For a
trenchant criticism of the Code's language, see Britton, Holder in Due Course—A Com-
parison of the Provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law with Those of Article 3 of
the Proposed Commercial Code, 49 Nw. U.L. Rev. 417, 447-50 (1954).
3 U.C.C. § 3-305. See Britton, Bills and Notes 521 (2d ed. 1961).
4 U.C.C. § 3-307(3).
5 U.C.C. § 3-307, Comment 3.
6 U.C.C. § 4-403(2).
7 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 674.4-403 (1966).
Cal. Comm. Code § 4403 (West 1964).
9 U.C.C. § 4-403, Comment 6. See also Brady, Bank Checks 425 (3d ed. 1962).
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The Code also provides that the stop-order must be received "at
such time and in such manner as to afford the bank a reasonable op-
portunity to act on it prior to any action by the bank with respect
to the item[s] described in Section 4-303.' 0 Section 4-303 provides
generally that the stop-order shall not be effective if it is received
after the bank has (1) certified or paid the check, (2) settled for it
without having a right to revoke the settlement, (3) completed the
process of posting to the account of the drawer or, (4) become ac-
countable for the check under a provisional posting arrangement or
because of its late return of the check. Florida's Code adopts the
above concepts, and then adds that the bank is not liable for failure
to comply with the stop-order on the same day it is received "unless
such ... failure . . . results from the willful and intentional disregard
of such order.""
Assuming that the bank pays a check after the receipt of a valid
stop-order, the Code provides that the "burden of establishing the
fact and amount of loss resulting from the payment . . . is on the
customer."" For example, if a bank, in violation of a valid stop-order,
paid the item to a holder in due course, the bank would obviously
have a complete defense to a suit brought against it by its drawer-
customer: the drawer would have had to pay the check to a holder
in due course, and the drawee bank steps into the shoes of such holder
when he is paid.' Conversely, if the bank improperly pays the check
to a payee or a holder who is not a holder in due course, the bank be-
comes subrogated to the rights of the drawer against the payee or
holder."
A number of cases decided prior to the Code held that a customer
could contractually relinquish any claim which he might have against
the bank if it should negligently pay a check in contravention of a
stop-order." These cases are apparently overruled by the Code, which
provides that the effect of Article Four may be varied by agreement,
"except that no agreement can disclaim a bank's responsibility for its
own lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care or can limit
the measure of damages for such lack or failure ...." 18
to u.C.C. § 4-4030).
11 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 674.4-403(1) (1966).
12 U.C.C. § 4-403(3).
13 U.C.C. § 4-407(a). See Brown, Bank Deposits and Collections, 48 Ky. L.J. 232,
235-36 (1960) ; Comment, Stop Payment: An Ailing Service to the Business Community,
20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 667, 674 (1953).
14 U.C.C. § 4-407(c).
12 Some courts held that these contractual waivers were invalid because they lacked
consideration or were contrary to public policy. Cases in the area are discussed in Britton,.
op. cit. supra note 3, at 520-21; Note, Stop Payment and the Uniform Commercial Code,
28 Ind. L.J. 95, 98-99 (1952); Comment, supra note 13, at 675-76.
la U.C.C. § 4-1030). Although the term "ordinary care" is partially defined in
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Certified Checks. Under both the Negotiable Instruments Law
and the Code, the certification of a check upon the request of a holder
results in the discharge of the drawer and all prior indorsers.' 7
 Certi-
fication of the check upon the request of the drawer, however, does
not discharge him. These differing results, predicated upon the fact of
who sought the certification, led courts working with the N.I.L. to
hold that when a check had been certified by the bank at the re-
quest of a holder, the drawer could not stop payment because he was dis-
charged from the instrument's On the other hand, if the drawer had
the check certified, he would not be discharged from liability, and
some courts have held that he would be able to stop payment on 1L 1°
Consistent with these propositions, it has been held that when the
payee or subsequent holder brought suit against a bank which refused
to pay a certified check over the drawer's stop-order, the certifying
bank could not assert any defenses of the drawer if the bank had
certified at the request of the payee or subsequent holder." Con-
versely, if the drawer had the check certified, the bank could avail
itself of his defenses when it was sued by the payee or a subsequent
holder.21 Of course, if the payee or the subsequent holder were found
to be a holder in due course, the bank would be liable on its certifica-
tion no matter who had requested it." Furthermore, if the check were
certified at the request of the drawer, he too would be liable to the
holder in due course.'
It is submitted that these rules were traps for the unwary, be-
cause a subsequent holder would have no certain way of knowing
whether the drawer or the payee or some prior holder had had the
check certified. The Code provides that a stop-order received by a
payor bank arrives too late if it is received after the bank has certi-
fied the item. 24 This section of the Code is stated in categorical terms,
and makes no reference to the qualifications that prevailed under the
N.I.L. As comment 5 to section 4-403 specifically states, there is no
right to stop payment after certification of a check or other acceptance
of a draft, "and this is true no matter who procures the certification."
This comment clearly enlarges the meaning of the literal text of sec-
§§ 4-103(3) and 4-202, the Code states that "the term 'ordinary care' is not defined and
is here used with its normal tort meaning and not in any special sense relating to bank
collections." U.C.C. § 4-103, Comment 4.
17 	 § 188; U.C.C. § 3-411.
18 See generally Brady, op. cit. supra note 9, at 161-62; Britton, op. cit. supra note
3, at 517-20; Ogden, Negotiable Instruments 498-502 (5th ed. 1947).
19 Ibid.
20 E.g., Bulliet v. Allegheny Trust Co., 284 Pa. 561, 131 Atl. 471 (1925).
21 E.g., Sutter v. Security Trust Co., 95 N.J. Eq. 44, 122 Atl. 381 (1923).
22 Ibid.
28 Supra note 18.
24 	§ 4-303.
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tions 3-411 and 4-303.25 The same comment continues with the state-
ment that "the acceptance is the drawee's own engagement to pay,
and he is not required to impair his credit by refusing payment for
the convenience of the drawer." If the certifying bank accedes to a
request to stop payment, and is then sued by the holder, the bank
should be able to assert the defenses of the drawer, if it certified the
check at his request, by "vouching in" the drawer as a party defen-
dant.25
II
A New York resident, staying in either New York or Latin
America, draws a check on a New York bank and delivers
it to a Latin American payee. The drawer then stops pay-
ment, and the payee indorses the check to a Latin American
holder.
In the first hypothetical fact situation, the legal relatiOnships
between the drawer, drawee-bank, payee, and holder were all governed
by the law of New York. In this second situation, the rights and liabili-
ties of the drawer with respect to the drawee-bank may be governed
by the law of New York or by the law of some Latin American country,
depending upon where the check was drawn. Furthermore, the rights
and liabilities of the payee and subsequent holders vis-à-vis the drawer
may be governed by the local law of the place of payment (New York)
or the local law of the place where the payee indorsed to the holder.
Whenever any of the various parties to a check are in different juris-
dictions, this may result in a choice-of-law problem. This section of
the article will examine the alternative fact situations presented in the
above hypothetical problem from the standpoint of the choice-of-law
rules in the United States and Latin America.
A. The United States
The Uniform Commercial Code. The Code attempts to articulate
one specific and one general choice-of-law rule in the field of negotia-
ble instruments. The specific provision firmly fixes the conflicts-of-law
rule for banks, whether they be payor, collecting, or depositary banks:
The liability of a bank for action or non-action with respect
to any item handled by it for purposes of presentment, pay-
25 This is so because the text of 3-411 speaks only in terms of those parties which
are discharged when the holder procures certification, and § 4-303 simply announces
the procedures by which a customer may stop payment on an item payable to his ac-
count.
26 U.C.C. 3-803 seems broad enough to allow this result. See also The Law of
Certification of Checks, 78 Banking L.J. 369, 384 (1961). But see Leo Syntax Auto
Sales, Inc. v. Peoples Bank & Say. Co., 6 Ohio Misc. 226, 215 N.E.2d 68 (C.P. 1965).
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ment or collection is governed by the law of the place where
the bank is located. In the case of action or non-action by or
at a branch or separate office of a bank, its liability is gov-
erned by the law of the place where the branch or separate
office is located. 27
The comments to the above section explain that the phrase "ac-
tion or non-action" is intended to make the rule applicable to all
phases of deposit, forwarding, payment, remittance or credit of pro-
ceeds, as well as to the stop payment process and the customer's right
to stop payment." It would appear, therefore, that the rights of a
drawer to stop payment of a check would be determined by the loca-
tion of the bank, and any local law where the drawer happened to
draw the check would affect neither his rights nor the obligation of
the bank to comply with the order. For example, if the drawer should
happen to be in Argentina (which forbids a stop-order on a check
until after the period for presentment has expired), 29
 and should draw
on his bank in New York and then seek to stop payment, his right to
stop payment, and the obligation of the bank to comply, would be con-
trolled by New York law rather than the law of Argentina.
The comments to this section further state that the rule of Weiss-
man v. Banque de Bruxelles" is rejected. In Weissman, a United
States Government check was issued in Washington, D.C. and mailed
to the payee-corporation in New York. The president of the corpora-
tion wrongfully indorsed the check to the Banque de Bruxelles in
Brussels, Belgium, for deposit to his own account. The Belgian bank
collected the check through collecting banks in New York and Wash-
ington. The president then withdrew the amount of the deposit for
his own use. The assignees of the receiver of the subsequently defunct
corporation brought suit in New York against the Belgian bank. Judge
Pound held that if the Belgian bank had acquired full title to the
check, the law of Belgium might properly be applied. However, there
was no full transfer of the check to the Belgian bank; the check was
received for collection, and the bank became an agent of the dishonest
indorser. The court was not entirely clear in its reasons why New
York law should be used to determine the effect of the indorsement
to the Belgian bank. Under the Code, the law of Belgium would be
applied to determine the rights of the indorsee-bank.
The specific reference to a rule governing the action or non-action
of a branch or separate office of a bank should be of great value to
27 U.C.C. 	 4-102(2).
28	§ 4-102, Comment 2(c).
29 Decreto Ley No. 4776, 12 junio, 1963, art. 29.
30 254 N.Y. 488, 173 N.E. 835 (1930).
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banks in the United States which have branches located in Central
and South America. Any suit brought against the parent bank in the
United States for the "action or non-action" of a branch located in
another country will be controlled by the commercial law of that other
country, rather than the local law of the state in which the parent
bank happens to be located.
In contradistinction to the clarity of the specific choice-of-law
rule governing the liability of banks, the Code's general choice-of-law
rule displays ambiguities which are only exceeded by its brevity:
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a trans-
action bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to
another state or nation the parties may agree that the law
either of this state or of such other state or nation shall gov-
ern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this Act
applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to
this state." (Emphasis added.)
In the ordinary case, the parties (drawer, payee, and indorsees)
will not, as a practical matter, have any express agreement that the
law of any one state or nation will govern the transaction. Therefore,
the italicized words present the Code's only practical choice-of-law
provision applicable to the rights and duties of the drawer vis-a-vis
subsequent parties, including the payee and indorsees.
It is submitted that this provision is, at best, useless, and, at
worst, a complete reversal of the traditional notions governing the
rights and duties of the parties to a check. The comments to this
section explain that the words "appropriate relation" would exclude
a case "where the parties have clearly contracted on the basis' of some
other law, as where the law of the place of contracting and the law of
the place of contemplated performance are the same and are contrary
to the law under the Code."" After excluding this relatively easy case,
the comments procede to the more difficult situations, but offer no
guidance. "Where a transaction has significant contacts with a state
which has enacted the Act and also with other jurisdictions, the ques-
tion what relation is 'appropriate' is left to judicial decision."" No
attempt is made to define the term "significant contacts." The com-
ments continue: "In deciding that question [appropriate relation], the
court is not strictly bound by precedents established in other con-
texts!"34 The comments then attempt to illustrate this statement:
Thus a conflict-of-laws decision refusing to apply a purely
31 U.C.C. § 1-105(1).
32 U.C.C.
	 1-105, Comment 2.
33 U.C.C. 1-105, Comment 3.
34 Ibid.
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local statute or rule of law to a particular multi-state trans-
action may not be valid precedent for refusal to-apply the
Code in an analogous situation. Application of the Code in
such circumstances may be justified by its comprehensive-
ness, by the policy of uniformity, and by the fact that it is
in large part a reformulation and restatement of the law
merchant and of the understanding of a business community
which transcends state and even national boundaries .... In
particular, where a transaction is governed in large part by
the Code, application of another law to some detail of per-
formance because of an accident of geography may violate
the commercial understanding of the parties." (Emphasis
added.)
Let us assume that a court has to determine the title and status
of a holder who acquired a check in Argentina. The check was drawn
by a New York drawer, upon a New York bank, payable to the order
of a New York payee, and the drawer has a personal defense to pay-
ment. A court could seize upon the italicized words and hold that the
indorsement to the holder was "an accident of geography" and that
the application of the local law of Argentina to determine the title
and legal status of the holder would "violate the commercial under-
standing of the parties." This result would be contrary to the rule of
lex rei sitae adopted by most of the western world. On the other hand,
a court could also decide that the choice-of-law rules of the Code are
of no help and then decide the case by the usual choice-of-law prin-
ciples.
It is submitted that the expressions "significant contacts" and
"appropriate relation" are traps for the businessman who must make
a prompt decision to receive or reject a check drawn and payable in
a foreign country. How can he predict what a court will decide as to
what contacts are significant or insignificant? How can he decide what
is or is not appropriate? Judicial hindsight is hardly a substitute for
business foresight. On the other hand, this foreign businessman, using
the traditional rule, will understand that his title and legal status in
relation to the drawer are governed by the local law where he acquired
the instrument. In fact, the general choice-of-law rule of the Code is
so vague that a court can use traditional choice-of-law concepts while
still paying lip service to the Code.
The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws. The 1960 Tentative
Draft of the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws (Second) states
that the obligations of the drawer of a bill are determined by the local
35 Ibid.
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law of the state where he delivered the instrument." If a bill indicates
where it was dated, that state is presumptively the state where the
drawer delivered the instrument, "and this presumption is conclusive
in the case of a subsequent holder in due course."' Since a city and
state are indicated on most checks, it seems that if the drawer draws
a check on his New York bank and mails it to a payee in Latin
America, New York would presumptively be the state of delivery. If
the payee then indorses the check to a holder in the same Latin Amer-
ican country, this presumption would be conclusive. The same rule
apparently would prevail even if the drawer actually drew the check
while visiting or temporarily residing in the same Latin American
country in which the payee and the subsequent holders resided. This
somewhat arbitrary rule has much to commend it because it helps
eliminate the awkward problem of determining the legal situs of the
contract when a check is drawn in one state and then mailed to an-
other. It should be noted, however, that if suit were brought against
the drawer in Latin America, the Latin American court could apply
the law of the place where the check was to be paid rather than the
law of the presumed state of delivery."
The comments to these provisions of the Restatement explain
that the term "obligations of a drawer" includes questions of whether
he had capacity to bind himself, and "whether he can successfully
raise against a subsequent holder in due course personal defenses, as
fraud in the inducement and lack of consideration, that would have
been available to him in a suit by his immediate transferee."" Al-
though the Restatement does provide that "minute details of present-
ment, payment, protest and notice of dishonor are determined by the
local law of the state where these activities take place,"'° it is ques-
tionable whether the drawer's right to stop payment would be clas-
sified as a "minute detail." It would seem, however, that the drawer's
right to stop payment should be controlled by the law of the state of
"delivery" of the check. Inasmuch as this presumed state of delivery
will, in most cases, be the state in which the drawee-bank is located,
the bank's duties in complying with the stop-order could then be said
to follow the law of the place of its location. This is the rule articu-
lated in the Code.
Although the local law of the presumed state of delivery of the
as Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws 354e (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960) [here-
inafter cited as Restatement].
a/ Ibid.
38 See, e.g., Convention for the Settlement of Certain Conflicts of Laws in Connec-
tion with Checks, 1931, arts. 5, 7(7), 143 L.N.T.S. 407.
39 Restatement § 354e, comment C.
49 Id. at § 354g.
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instrument establishes whether the drawer may assert personal de-
fenses against a holder in due course, the Restatement provides that
the validity and effect of an attempted transfer of a negotiable instru-
ment are determined by the law of the state where the instrument was
at the time of the transfer." It should be noted that the Restatement
has utilized the property concepts of "delivery" and "where the in-
strument was at the time of transfer" rather than the contractual term
of lex loci contractus—the law of the situs of the contract. Reasonable
men may differ as to the place of the contract when a check is drawn
in one state and mailed to a payee in another state, but most people
could agree that the state of the payee is "where the instrument was
at the time of its transfer."
B. International Conflicts-of-Law Treaties
The majority of the Latin American countries, as well as the
continental European countries, have entered into a number of multi-
lateral conventions which affect the choice-of-law rules controlling
negotiable instruments. Unfortunately, the United States has not been
a party to any of these conventions, and, of course, they do not bind
its courts. Some attention, however, ought to be given to them by
the courts because they reflect, in a readily accessible form, the
choice-of-law rules prevailing in Latin America. North American
courts ought to exhibit judicial respect for the choice-of-law rules of
a country whose law may be involved in the construction and enforce-
ment of a negotiable instrument. Further, a U.S. court could reason
by analogy from these conventions when the choice-of-law rules of
the forum are ambiguous or nonexistent. Finally, adoption by the
United States of the principles articulated in these conventions might
induce courts in Latin America to follow similar principles when deal-
ing with U.S. citizens who are parties to a negotiable instrument.
The Bustamante Code. The Bustamante Code of 1928" has been
ratified by Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicara-
gua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela, and signed but not ratified by
Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay." This Code
deals with most of the choice-of-law questions which could arise in
the field of negotiable instruments. Under the Code, the forms of
order, indorsement, acceptance, and protest of a bill of exchange are
subject to the law of the locality in which each one of these acts takes
place." These rules are applicable to checks as well as to bills of ex-
41 Id. at § 354f.
42 4 Hudson, International Legislation 2283-354 (1931).
48 Pan American Treaty Series, 9 rev. 1961.
44 Bustamante Code art. 263.
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change." In the absence of an express or implied agreement, the legal
relations between the drawer and the payee are governed by the law
of the place where the bill is drawn." Similarly, the legal relations be-
tween the indorser and the indorsee depend upon the law of the place
where the bill has been indorsed.'
In summary, it would appear that under the Bustamante Code,
if a check were drawn in New York and mailed to a payee in Latin
America, the law of New York—the place where the check was drawn
—would control the legal relations between the drawer and the payee.
If, however, the payee should then indorse the check to a holder in
his country, the law of that country would determine the status of the
holder vis-à-vis the New York drawer. The Code fails to make any
specific statement as to which law controls if the drawer should at-
tempt to stop payment of a check. However, since the form of the
order is controlled by the law of the country where the act occurs, it
seems that a stop-order should be governed by the same law."
C. Certified Checks and the Choice of Law
The questions relating to whether a check can be certified, and
the effects of certification, present peculiar problems in the conflicts-
of-law area. Many Latin American countries do not permit certifica-
tion of checks, and those Latin countries which do permit it do not
agree on the legal effects of certification." In the United States, the
certifying bank becomes the primary party on the instrument, the
drawer is discharged, and the holder may seek payment only from
the drawee-acceptor or the indorsers when a party other than the
drawer has had the check certified."
As indicated above, the U.C.C. provides that the law "of the
place where the bank is located" controls the effects of certification
of a check 5' Suppose, for example, that the holder of a check pro-
vides certification of the check by a branch of a New York bank,
which branch is located in a non-Code state. If the certifying branch
refuses payment because the drawer had obtained a stop-order, and
the holder brings suit in New York against the New York bank, the
forum state (New York) should apply the law of the non-Code state
45 Bustamante Code art. 271.
48 Bustamante Code art. 264.
47 Bustamante Code art. 266.
48 Among other less important compacts are the Convention for the Settlement of
Certain Conflicts of Laws in Connection with Checks, 1931, 143 L.N.T.S. 407, ratified
only by Nicaragua, and the Treaty on International Commercial Terrestial Law of 1940,
8 Hudson, International Legislation 498 (1949), ratified only by Argentina, Paraguay,
and Uruguay.
49 See, e.g., COdigo de Comercio de Nicaragua art. 689.
59 See discussion pp. 228-29 supra.
51	§ 4-102(2).
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to determine whether a drawer may stop payment of a certified check,
and, if so, the effects of the certification.
On the other hand, the 1960 Tentative Draft of the Restatement
provides that the obligations of the acceptor of a bill are determined
"by the local law of the state designated in the instrument as the
place of payment?'" If a bill does not indicate a place of payment,
the obligations are determined by the local law of the state where
the acceptor delivered the instrument, and "that state is presump-
tively that state where the instrument is dated, if such a state is indi-
cated, and this presumption is conclusive in the case of a subsequent
holder in due course."" It appears, however, that despite the differ-
ence in wording between the U.C.C. and the Restatement, the result
would ordinarily be the same, because the place where the certifying
bank is located would generally be the place of payment. This latter
result would be true even in the unlikely case of a drawer who draws
a check in Latin America and then mails it to New York for certifica-
tion before he negotiates it, and it certainly would be true when the
drawer draws a check and has it certified in New York or delivers it
to a payee in New York who then has the bank certify it. It would
also be true if the Latin American payee had the check certified by
a New York bank. Under both the U.C.C. and the Restatement, the
location of the person who presents a check for certification, whether
he be the drawer, payee, or indorsee, should have no bearing on the
bank's obligations.
The Bustamante Code provides that the form of the acceptance
is subject to the law of the locality in which the act of acceptance
takes place." Likewise, "the obligations and rights existing between
the acceptor and the holder are regulated by the law of the place in
which the acceptance was made."" It would seem that the Bustamante
Code is consistent in result with both the U.C.C. and the Restatement,
although the wording of the rules is quite different."
Thus, there are three different approaches to the question of what
52 Restatement § 354d.
53 Ibid.
54 Bustamante Code art. 263.
55 Bustamante Code art. 265. These rules are applied to checks through article 271.
56 The Convention for the Settlement of Certain Conflicts of Laws in Connection
with Checks, 1931, 143 L.N.T.S. 407, provides that the law of the country in which the
check is payable shall determine "whether a check can be accepted, certified, confirmed
or visaed and what effects are respectively of such acceptance, certification, confirmation
or visa." The article also provides that the law of the place of payment determines
whether the drawer may countermand payment of a check. Arts. 7(3), (7). The Treaty
on International Commercial Terrestial Law of 1940, 8 Hudson, International Legislation
498 (1949), provides that the law of the place where the check is to be paid determines
"whether or not the check can be accepted, crossed, certified or confirmed, and the
effects of these operations" and "the right of the drawer to revoke the check or to oppose
payment." Arts. 33(2), 34(4).
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law should control the obligations of an acceptor. The Restatement
suggests the place of payment, the U.C.C. suggests the location of the
bank, and the Bustamante Code suggests the place of acceptance.
Regardless of which rule is applied, however, the result should be the
same, since the place of payment, location of the bank, and place of
acceptance are generally the same.
III
A New York resident, while visiting or living in Latin Amer-
ica, issues a check, drawn on a Latin American bank, to a
payee in the same country. The drawer then stops payment,
and the payee indorses the check to a holder in the same
country.
The laws of the various Latin American countries governing stop-
orders are far from consistent. Although there are certain countries
which have stop-order provisions similar to those of the U.C.C.,"
most Latin American countries approach the problem differently."
The type of provision that is perhaps most unusual is that which
allows a stop-order but provides criminal penalties for an unjustified
attempt to stop payment. The Dominican Republic uses this tactic."
That country permits the countermand of a check if a written stop-
order is received by the bank before it makes payment. However, a
drawer who stops payment risks being convicted of embezzlement
on the ground that "he had ordered the drawee, without justified
cause, not to effectuate payment.' Honduras provides that if a
drawer stops payment before expiration of the time for presentment,
the drawer has committed embezzlement unless "he proves that he
did not have a deceitful intention."' Chilean law requires a drawer
to make funds available to pay the amount of the check and judicial
costs within three days after protest is made or be sentenced to hard
labor."
Another unusual way of attacking the problem is that adopted
by Brazil, whose law provides that "those who issue checks without
dates or with false dates, or who by counterorder without legal reason
procure to frustrate their payment, subject themselves to a penalty
• 57 E.g., Bolivia, Ley de 5 de diciembre, art. 9; Ecuador, Ley de Cheques de 18 de
noviembre, 1927, art. 27; C6digo de Comercio del El Salvador, art. 460.
68 E.g., Argentina, Decreto Ley No. 4776, 12 junio, 1963, art. 29; Mexico, Ley
General de Titulos y Operaciones de Credito, 1932, art. 185.
59 Ley de Cheques No. 2850, 12 de mayo de 1951, art. 33b.
On Ley de Cheques No. 2850, 12 de mayo de 1951, art. 66.
67 C6digo de Comercio art. 606.
62 Decreto No. 3777 de 3 de noviembre de 1943, art. 22, Modificado por la ley 7498
de 17 del agosto de 1943. Venezuela also provides for criminal penalties. C6cligo de
Comercio art. 494.
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of ten per cent above the respective amount [of the check]. . . . 1,63
This appears to be a clever approach to the problem since payment
may be stopped for a legal reason, but a monetary penalty is assessed
if the stop payment is made for some illegal reason."
Certified Checks. The Anglo-American concept that a drawee-
bank may certify a check and thereby become liable as an acceptor
is strange to most civil-law countries." In those Latin American
countries which permit certification, however, there does not seem to be
any uniformity as to its legal effect or the effect of a stop-order issued
against a certified check. In Argentina, "certification only has effect to
establish the existence of the funds and to impede their withdrawal by
the drawer during the period agreed [not to exceed five days] . . . .' ,66
In Honduras and El Salvador, certification is permitted, but the drawer
may revoke the check if he returns it to the bank for cancellation.'
The Concept of Holder in Due Course vis-a-vis the Drawer. Al-
though there is no Latin American equivalent to the U.S. distinction
between defenses as either real or personal, most civil-law countries
have divided the concept of defenses into two classes: the cambiarias
exceptions—absolute defenses, which pertain exclusively to suits in-
volving negotiable instruments pursuant to the commercial codes; and
extra-cambiarias defenses—relative defenses, which arise out of the
provisions of the civil codes or codes of civil procedure. The cambiarias
defenses, similar to the real defenses of Anglo-American law, may be
asserted against any holder, but the extra-cambiarias defenses will not
have the same effect as the personal defenses in U.S. law.
63 Decreto N. 2.591 de 7 del agosto de 1912, art. 6. See 3 Waldemar Ferreira, Insti-
tui96es de Direito Commercial § 821 (1953).
64 Nicaragua states that the drawee shall refuse payment "when the drawer or holder
has provided in writing to the drawee that it should not make payment and this notice
has been received before the presentation of the check." COdigo de Comercio art. 691.
Costa Rica's new adigo de Comercio permits a counterorder for theft, robbery, loss,
or because violence was exercised in the obtaining of the check. Arts. 822-25. The
Uruguayan Ley 6895, 1919, states that banks shall refuse to pay checks "if the drawer
and the holder have advised the bank in time and in writing that it is not to make pay-
ment." Art. 13b.
65 Guatemala expressly prohibits acceptance of a check. COdigo de Comercio art.
787. Nicaragua also prohibits acceptance. COdigo de Comercio art. 689. Ecuador's law
is less clear, but it seems that in Ecuador, acceptance does not bind the drawee bank.
Ley de Cheques de 18 de noviembre, 1927, art. 21.
66 Decreto Ley No. 4776, 12 junio, 1963, arts. 48-49.
67 COdigo de Comercio de Honduras art. 621; COdigo de Comercio del El Salvador
art. 461. Mexican law is very similar, and "the certified check is not negotiable." Ley
General de Titulos y Operaciones de Credito, 1932, art. 199. See Tena, Titulos de Credito
§ 253 (1956). Costa Rican law articulates a conceptual approach which is similar to that
in U.C.C. §§ 3-411, 4-303. COdigo de Comercio art. 828. Colombia and Panama, through
their respective adoptions of the NIL., permit certification and forbid the stop payment
of a certified check. COdigo de Comercio de Colombia arts. 188-90; COdigo de Comercio
de Panama arts. 187-89; see Velarde y la Guardia, Tradado Sobre la Ley de Documentos
Negociables 534-38 (1951).
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At the risk of over-generalizing, it might be said that most of the
civil-law countries include the following as cambiarias defenses:"
(1) The drawer or maker was incompetent.
(2) Signatures of the drawer or other obligated persons
were obtained by force.
(3) Material limitations were added with the signature of
an obligated person, e.g., the drawee accepted the bill
of exchange for a lesser amount than called for by the
drawer, or an indorser indorsed "without responsi-
bility."
(4) The transferral of the instrument was defective or the
legal character of the plaintiff was defective, e.g., an
irregular chain of indorsements.
(5) There was a violation of the legal provisions which re-
quire certain specific formalities, e.g., failure to present
the bill for acceptance, failure to make protest after
refusal, or defects in the protest.
(6) There was a formality prohibiting the cambiarias ac-
tion, e.g., statute of limitations.
(7) There was payment, provided that the fact of payment
has been noted on the instrument.
The above cambiarias defenses, with the exception of number (5),
closely resemble some . of the real defenses in Anglo-American law.
The following extra-cambiarias or "relative" defenses are applicable
in most civil-law countries:"
(1) Those defenses based on the transaction underlying
issuance of the instrument. For example, a check is
issued in payment of merchandise and the merchandise
was never delivered by the payee. This breach of con-
tract may be asserted by the drawer of the check when
issued by the payee. This defense may not, in the usual
case, be asserted against an indorsee from the payee.
(2) Those defenses derived from personal relations exist-
ing between the defendant and the plaintiff. For ex-
ample, if the drawer of a check is sued by the indorsee,
the drawer may assert that the indorsee owes money
68 See generally Ascarelli, Derecho Mercantil 512-16 (Mex. 1940) ; Antelo y Bellucci,
Tecnica Juridica del Cheque 130-32, 168, 255-60 (Argen. 2d ed. 1961) ; Cucurella y
Aviles, Derecho Mercantil 448-53 (Spain 2d ed. 1953) ; Davis, La Letra de Cambio 221-25
(Chile 1957) ; I Vincente y Gella, Curso de Derecho Mercantil Comparado 406-10 (Spain
2d ed. 1951).
69 See authorities cited note 68 supra.
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to the drawer as the result of a separate loan trans-
action.
( 3) The defenses of novation, compromise, remission, com-
pensation, confusion, and payment may be asserted,
provided that they arise out of the personal relations
of the defendant and the plaintiff, but the defense of
payment may be asserted against any one if the fact of
payment is noted on the instrument.
It should be noted that these extra-cambiarias defenses are not
synonymous, with the personal defenses of Anglo-American law. The
former are limited to use against an indorsee who has had one of the
specified' legal relationships with the drawer, while personal defenses
in Anglo-American law can be asserted against any indorsee who takes
with knowledge of the existence of the defense, without giving value,
or in bad faith."
This last point, the good or bad faith of the holder, is treated
quite differently in Latin American countries. Most Latin American
text writers do not even mention good or bad faith when discussing
these concepts in relation to the question of what "contractual" de-
fenses the drawer may assert against the holder. These concepts, when
discussed at all, are usually mentioned in conjunction with questions
of title; the holder who has acquired the instrument in bad faith may
not be the legitimate owner of the instrument, and for that reason the
drawer may assert defenses against him which do not pertain exclu-
sively to the question of title, but may also include contractual de-
fenses.'
For a holder to have taken in bad faith under the U.C.C., it is
sufficient if he has been unilaterally dishonest." In Latin America, on
the other hand, it is generally required that the dishonesty involve
collusion between the indorser and indorsee."
In addition to the requirement that the holder take in good faith
and without notice of any defense or claim to the instrument on the
part of any person, the U.C.C. requires that the holder take the in-
strument "for value."' In all Latin America, however, only two coun-
tries, Colombia and Panama, clearly require that a holder take for
70 The complex procedural devices of the civilian systems further complicate the
concepts of cambiarias and extra-cambiarias. See Murray, A Survey of Civil Procedure
in Spain and Some Comparisons with Civil Procedure in the United States, 37 Tul. L.
Rev. 399 (1963).
77 Supra note 68.
72 U.C.C. 	 1-201(18).
73 Davis, La Letra de Cambio 224 (1957).
77 . U.C.C. §¢ 1-201(44), 3-302, -303.
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value in order to be a holder in due course, and this is because both
countries have copied the American N.I.L. 75
It might be argued that any discussion of the question of value
is more theoretical than real, because the vast majority of holders
will in fact take for value. There is, however, one transaction which
could present a very real problem. In the hypothetical situation pre-
sented in this section, the payee, rather than indorsing to a holder,
might deposit the check to his account in a bank in his country. If
that bank does not allow its customer to draw on the check, but in-
dorses it to its U.S. branch for collection, the branch would step into
the shoes of its indorser—the Latin American bank. The plaintiff-col-
lecting bank in the United States, though never having given value,
would merely have to prove that its principal (the indorser) had not
knowingly acted to the detriment of the drawer. It should then be able
to recover against the drawer who might have some personal defense
against the payee.
IV. CONCLUSION
There seems to be little hope that the United States and the
majority of Latin American countries will ever agree on the terms
of a meaningful convention unifying the negotiable instruments laws
of the two hemispheres." The mutations of the original lex mercatoria
by Anglo-Saxon and continental developments would appear too di-
verse to be reconciled. The unfortunate reluctance of the United
States to become a party to conventions dealing with private inter-
national law would seem to mitigate against unification of the choice-
of-law rules. If there is a solution to this problem, it seems to be only
in the mutual, widespread dissemination of knowledge of the laws of
the respective countries.
75 Uruguay might arguably be included in this small group. Ley 6895, 1919, art. 19;
COdigo de Comercio arts. 822-23.
70 See Nadelmann, The Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods: A Con-
flict of Laws Imbroglio, 74 Yale L.J. 449 (1965).
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